The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission‘s (NRC) fundamental approach to regulating safety is being questioned in the wake of the nuclear disaster in Japan, not just by the usual nuclear critics but by the commissioners themselves.
And that could mean big new costs for US nuclear plants – and electric ratepayers.
That’s because Fukushima was caused by two highly unlikely events, a massive earthquake, 9.0 on the Richter Scale, and a massive tsunami that may have towered 50 feet. But they both happened, within an hour of each other and at the same place.
NRC’s whole approach to regulation for more than a quarter century has assumed that what did happen simply couldn’t. NRC assumed events couldn’t be as severe as Fukushima, couldn’t happen together, and couldn’t disable more than one unit at a site at a time.
Over the last three decades, NRC has increasingly moved to a “risk informed” regulatory approach. The regulator and nuclear plant operators try to identify the most dangerous weaknesses in plant operations and focus on fixing the issues that make the most difference.
Risk-informed regulation was built on an NRC 1985 backfit rule, which says the costs of a new regulation should be justified by the benefits it brings in avoided accident costs. After the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island-2, NRC issued a frenzy of new rules. Utilities complained the rules were costly, confusing, and even counterproductive, and commissioners decided to discipline their system with the backfit rule. That requires calculations of the likelihood of a potential accident and its consequences.
The backfit rule has been fundamental to NRC regulation since, as the agency expanded “risk-informed” regulation. But at a recent [May 12] NRC staff briefing on Fukushima, Chairman Gregory Jaczko questioned whether NRC has been calculating the benefit side accurately.
“How do we deal with the cost of cleanup?” Jaczko asked. He pointed to the region around Fukushima Daiichi where radioactive materials must be found and removed so people can live there again. That work is estimated to cost Tokyo Electric Power millions.
Jaczko said he worries that inaccurate cost-benefit assumptions “can hinder our ability to impose requirements.”
Commissioner Gus Apostolakis went further, questioning whether NRC should reconsider its “design basis.” Nuclear plants must be able to cope with any challenges in the design basis, including site-specific risks like an earthquake or flood. But occasionally things happen that are “beyond design basis,” like Fukushima – and the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
Apostolakis said he’s “bothered” by the distinction, because NRC regulates the “design basis” closely, but for “beyond design basis” events, may ask the industry to take voluntary measures, which are not enforced. He questioned whether NRC is striking the right balance.
He pointed to the agency’s 9/11 response. NRC told operators to analyze what would happen if something like an aircraft crash disabled a large section of their plants. Much of that analysis remains classified, but in recent weeks, utilities and NRC have said post-9/11 measures, like staging fire-fighting equipment all around plants, mean US plants can better manage a Fukushima-like event.
But when NRC inspectors looked closely last month, they found that nearly a third of plants weren’t ready. Equipment wasn’t in position, or wasn’t operative.
NRC experts also questioned whether operators have clear emergency procedures, because some are NRC-required while others are from the industry. They’re also re-opening issues like whether NRC should force utilities to move spent fuel into dry casks. It’s cheaper for utilities to cram the fuel into pools, as was done at Fukushima: US operators successfully fought a dry cask ruling after 9/11.
NRC staff and commissioners insist US plants are safe – after Fukushima, they say, they’re looking at safety “enhancements.” But reopening the backfit rule, the design basis, and the post-9/11 response means fundamental reconsideration of NRC’s regulatory approach.
The industry claims to have spent more than $1 billion responding to 9/11, costs passed on to electric customers. That could turn out to be just the down payment on Fukushima.
Above Picture: Workers wear radiation protective clothing during an annual nuclear safety drill held within a nuclear power plant in Wanli, New Taipei City, on May 17, 2011. The drill was aimed to beef up Taiwan’s capability to cope with a Japan-style nuclear crisis after a 9.0-magnitude killer earthquake and an ensuing tsunami hit Japan on March 11, paralising a nuclear power plant in Japan’s northeastern Fukushima prefecture.
